Jose Nazario from Arbor Network reports on the DDoS attacks
on Estonia. 

He provides no comment as to the source of these attacks,
only technical facts, however, we will all be looking at how the EU responds to
this attack on a member state of the Union. This will
tell us how much backbone the unelected EU control freaks may have and how they would look to protect its borders and citizens when the unwelcome, and
undemocratic treaty and constitution are put in place. 

He says ATLAS gives us
an amazing view into the Internet’s activities. ATLAS collects DoS attack data
from around the world through sharing arrangements and even from some of our Peakflow
SP
deployments. As such, the recent DDoS attacks on Estonia
are visible, in part, from within ATLAS.

As you can imagine, having development access to the ATLAS data repository
allows me to build new reports and crunch the data in new and exciting ways. I
analyzed about 2 weeks of DDoS attacks on Estonia
this morning using internal tools and reporting systems, and here’s what I
found.

We’ve seen 128 unique DDoS attacks on Estonian websites in the past two
weeks through ATLAS. Of these, 115 were ICMP floods, 4 were TCP
SYN floods, and 9 were generic traffic floods. Attacks were not distributed
uniformly, with some sites seeing more attacks than others:

Attacks

Destination

Address or
owner

35

“195.80.105.107/32?

pol.ee

7

“195.80.106.72/32?

www.riigikogu.ee

36

“195.80.109.158/32?

www.riik.ee, www.peaminister.ee, www.valitsus.ee

2

“195.80.124.53/32?

m53.envir.ee

2

“213.184.49.171/32?

www.sm.ee

6

“213.184.49.194/32?

www.agri.ee

4

“213.184.50.6/32?

 

35

“213.184.50.69/32?

www.fin.ee (Ministry of Finance)

1

“62.65.192.24/32?

 

The attacks themselves haven’t been steady, at least from the perspective
given by ATLAS. If we look at how many attacks occurred on every day, we can
see that they peaked a week or so ago, but they haven’t necessarily stopped.

Attacks

Date

 

21

2007-05-03

 

17

2007-05-04

 

31

2007-05-08

 

58

2007-05-09

 

1

2007-05-11

 

As for how long the attacks have lasted, quite a number of them last under
an hour. However, when you think about how many attacks have occurred for some
of the targets, this translates into a very long-lived attack. The longest
attacks themselves were over 10 and a half hours long sustained, dealing a
truly crushing blow to the endpoints.

Attacks

Date

 

17

less than 1 minute

 

78

1 min – 1 hour

 

16

1 hour – 5 hours

 

8

5 hours to 9 hours

 

7

10 hours or more

 

Finally, this is a decent sized botnet behind the attack, with aggregate
bandwidth at our points of measurement maxing out at nearly 100 Mbps.

Attacks

Bandwidth
measured

 

42

Less than 10 Mbps

 

52

10 Mbps – 30 Mbps

 

22

30 Mbps – 70 Mbps

 

12

70 Mbps – 95 Mbps

 

Largest attacks we measured: 10 attacks measured at 90 Mbps, lasting upwards
of 10 hours. All in all, someone is very, very deliberate in putting the hurt
on Estonia, and
this kind of thing is only going to get more severe in the coming years.

 

Jose Nazario from Arbor Network reports on the DDoS attacks
on Estonia. 

He provides no comment as to the source of these attacks,
only technical facts, however, we will all be looking at how the EU responds to
this attack on a member state of the Union. This will
tell us how much backbone the unelected EU control freaks may have and how they would look to protect its borders and citizens when the unwelcome, and
undemocratic treaty and constitution are put in place. 

He says ATLAS gives us
an amazing view into the Internet’s activities. ATLAS collects DoS attack data
from around the world through sharing arrangements and even from some of our Peakflow
SP
deployments. As such, the recent DDoS attacks on Estonia
are visible, in part, from within ATLAS.

As you can imagine, having development access to the ATLAS data repository
allows me to build new reports and crunch the data in new and exciting ways. I
analyzed about 2 weeks of DDoS attacks on Estonia
this morning using internal tools and reporting systems, and here’s what I
found.

We’ve seen 128 unique DDoS attacks on Estonian websites in the past two
weeks through ATLAS. Of these, 115 were ICMP floods, 4 were TCP
SYN floods, and 9 were generic traffic floods. Attacks were not distributed
uniformly, with some sites seeing more attacks than others:

Attacks

Destination

Address or
owner

35

“195.80.105.107/32?

pol.ee

7

“195.80.106.72/32?

www.riigikogu.ee

36

“195.80.109.158/32?

www.riik.ee, www.peaminister.ee, www.valitsus.ee

2

“195.80.124.53/32?

m53.envir.ee

2

“213.184.49.171/32?

www.sm.ee

6

“213.184.49.194/32?

www.agri.ee

4

“213.184.50.6/32?

 

35

“213.184.50.69/32?

www.fin.ee (Ministry of Finance)

1

“62.65.192.24/32?

 

The attacks themselves haven’t been steady, at least from the perspective
given by ATLAS. If we look at how many attacks occurred on every day, we can
see that they peaked a week or so ago, but they haven’t necessarily stopped.

Attacks

Date

 

21

2007-05-03

 

17

2007-05-04

 

31

2007-05-08

 

58

2007-05-09

 

1

2007-05-11

 

As for how long the attacks have lasted, quite a number of them last under
an hour. However, when you think about how many attacks have occurred for some
of the targets, this translates into a very long-lived attack. The longest
attacks themselves were over 10 and a half hours long sustained, dealing a
truly crushing blow to the endpoints.

Attacks

Date

 

17

less than 1 minute

 

78

1 min – 1 hour

 

16

1 hour – 5 hours

 

8

5 hours to 9 hours

 

7

10 hours or more

 

Finally, this is a decent sized botnet behind the attack, with aggregate
bandwidth at our points of measurement maxing out at nearly 100 Mbps.

Attacks

Bandwidth
measured

 

42

Less than 10 Mbps

 

52

10 Mbps – 30 Mbps

 

22

30 Mbps – 70 Mbps

 

12

70 Mbps – 95 Mbps

 

Largest attacks we measured: 10 attacks measured at 90 Mbps, lasting upwards
of 10 hours. All in all, someone is very, very deliberate in putting the hurt
on Estonia, and
this kind of thing is only going to get more severe in the coming years.

 

Jose Nazario from Arbor Network reports on the DDoS attacks
on Estonia. 

He provides no comment as to the source of these attacks,
only technical facts, however, we will all be looking at how the EU responds to
this attack on a member state of the Union. This will
tell us how much backbone the unelected EU control freaks may have and how they would look to protect its borders and citizens when the unwelcome, and
undemocratic treaty and constitution are put in place. 

He says ATLAS gives us
an amazing view into the Internet’s activities. ATLAS collects DoS attack data
from around the world through sharing arrangements and even from some of our Peakflow
SP
deployments. As such, the recent DDoS attacks on Estonia
are visible, in part, from within ATLAS.

As you can imagine, having development access to the ATLAS data repository
allows me to build new reports and crunch the data in new and exciting ways. I
analyzed about 2 weeks of DDoS attacks on Estonia
this morning using internal tools and reporting systems, and here’s what I
found.

We’ve seen 128 unique DDoS attacks on Estonian websites in the past two
weeks through ATLAS. Of these, 115 were ICMP floods, 4 were TCP
SYN floods, and 9 were generic traffic floods. Attacks were not distributed
uniformly, with some sites seeing more attacks than others:

Attacks

Destination

Address or
owner

35

“195.80.105.107/32?

pol.ee

7

“195.80.106.72/32?

www.riigikogu.ee

36

“195.80.109.158/32?

www.riik.ee, www.peaminister.ee, www.valitsus.ee

2

“195.80.124.53/32?

m53.envir.ee

2

“213.184.49.171/32?

www.sm.ee

6

“213.184.49.194/32?

www.agri.ee

4

“213.184.50.6/32?

 

35

“213.184.50.69/32?

www.fin.ee (Ministry of Finance)

1

“62.65.192.24/32?

 

The attacks themselves haven’t been steady, at least from the perspective
given by ATLAS. If we look at how many attacks occurred on every day, we can
see that they peaked a week or so ago, but they haven’t necessarily stopped.

Attacks

Date

 

21

2007-05-03

 

17

2007-05-04

 

31

2007-05-08

 

58

2007-05-09

 

1

2007-05-11

 

As for how long the attacks have lasted, quite a number of them last under
an hour. However, when you think about how many attacks have occurred for some
of the targets, this translates into a very long-lived attack. The longest
attacks themselves were over 10 and a half hours long sustained, dealing a
truly crushing blow to the endpoints.

Attacks

Date

 

17

less than 1 minute

 

78

1 min – 1 hour

 

16

1 hour – 5 hours

 

8

5 hours to 9 hours

 

7

10 hours or more

 

Finally, this is a decent sized botnet behind the attack, with aggregate
bandwidth at our points of measurement maxing out at nearly 100 Mbps.

Attacks

Bandwidth
measured

 

42

Less than 10 Mbps

 

52

10 Mbps – 30 Mbps

 

22

30 Mbps – 70 Mbps

 

12

70 Mbps – 95 Mbps

 

Largest attacks we measured: 10 attacks measured at 90 Mbps, lasting upwards
of 10 hours. All in all, someone is very, very deliberate in putting the hurt
on Estonia, and
this kind of thing is only going to get more severe in the coming years.

 

Belgian senate hopeful Tania Derveaux is offering voters
something a bit more tempting than a one per cent cut in VAT and better rubbish
collections, or as in the Welsh Assembly elections laptops, lightbulbs and
toothbrushes.

Tania is representing NEE, an impartial protest movement running for senate
in the Belgian elections of June 10th
2007
.

NEE works around political awareness and offers voters in Belgium
the option to vote 'NEE' if they find that none of the parties deserve their
vote. NEE votes would simply go to empty seats in parliament, resulting in a
loss of income and power among the other parties and giving the voters the
power to sanction politicians if needed.

Just how the other candidates to become Senate members are
going to compete with this,
I really don’t know, and will it be enough to stop the march of the European Commission.

Wonder how the Electoral Commission in the UK
would cope if it ever caught on.

 

 

Note: I have not scanned the site, you enter at your own
risk.

 

Belgian senate hopeful Tania Derveaux is offering voters
something a bit more tempting than a one per cent cut in VAT and better rubbish
collections, or as in the Welsh Assembly elections laptops, lightbulbs and
toothbrushes.

Tania is representing NEE, an impartial protest movement running for senate
in the Belgian elections of June 10th
2007
.

NEE works around political awareness and offers voters in Belgium
the option to vote 'NEE' if they find that none of the parties deserve their
vote. NEE votes would simply go to empty seats in parliament, resulting in a
loss of income and power among the other parties and giving the voters the
power to sanction politicians if needed.

Just how the other candidates to become Senate members are
going to compete with this,
I really don’t know, and will it be enough to stop the march of the European Commission.

Wonder how the Electoral Commission in the UK
would cope if it ever caught on.

 

 

Note: I have not scanned the site, you enter at your own
risk.